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Two decades after the handover, many observers, academics, and jour-nalists would agree that press freedom in Hong Kong has declined overtime. The titles of the annual reports by the Hong Kong Journalists As-
sociation (HKJA) in the last decade regularly express concern about threats
to freedom of expression and of the press, e.g. “Hong Kong media faces se-
rious harassment and self-censorship” (HKJA 2015), “Beijing turns the screws
on Hong Kong media” (HKJA 2017). In the World Press Freedom Index of Re-
porters Without Borders, Hong Kong’s ranking fell from 18 in 2002 to 73 in
2017. (1)
However, press freedom is not entirely dead. Freedom House rated the
Hong Kong press as “partly free” in 2017. As opposed to the mainland, there
is no system of governmental pre-publication censorship. There has been
continual negotiation between the media and political power (Lee 2000;
Ma 2007) and journalistic resistance within media organisations (Au 2017;
Lee and Chan 2009). Nevertheless, how effective can the negotiation and
resistance be in the long run? Is the media system developing in ways
favouring the defence or furthering the demise of press freedom? 
This article attempts to address these questions by reviewing the changing
political economy of the Hong Kong media. Two specifications are in order.
First, given the concern with press freedom, the article focuses primarily on
the news media. The article uses the terms news media and media largely
interchangeably. However, because the news media are inextricably em-
bedded in the larger media system, drawing a clean line between news and
non-news media is unnecessary and can be misleading. Second, this article
examines the question of press freedom from the political economy per-
spective. It does not directly address the much broader issue of freedom of
speech, which would relate to additional issues such as the changing legal
parameters of free speech in the city.
Following Mosco (2009), the political economic analysis of this article
emphasises the structuration of the media system, i.e. the analysis sees the
political economic structure as continually reproduced through interactions
among various forces. The analysis consists of three main parts. The first
part follows past scholarship to outline the ownership structure of the Hong
Kong media system, while noting how several counteracting forces have
prevented the media from succumbing totally to political power. The second
part examines the changing media businesses and outlines the background
for the growth of “direct investment” by Chinese capital in the Hong Kong
media scene. The third part discusses the implications of digital transfor-
mation, including its impact on the mainstream media, the growth of al-
ternative media, and how the state responds to the “digital challenge.” The
concluding section highlights the implications of the analysis. 
Methodologically, this article draws upon data derived from multiple
sources, including archival materials, news reports, media corporations’ an-
nual financial reports, data from the existing literature, and data from sur-
veys of journalists and news readers available to the author. Similar to many
political economic analyses of the media industry, the various data and ma-
terials were used to reconstruct a holistic account of the dynamic develop-
ment of the media system in Hong Kong. 
From ownership structure to continual
negotiation
Although this article focuses on changes after the handover, it might help
contextualise the discussion by starting with press freedom before 1997.
The colonial Hong Kong government had long established various harsh
press laws. But the laws were seldom utilised to control the press, partly
because of the need to avoid provoking China, and partly because the Hong
Kong press in the immediate post-war decades focused mainly on Chinese
politics instead of social and political affairs in Hong Kong. “Press freedom”
was, for a long period of time, the freedom to criticise both the Communist
regime in the PRC and the KMT regime in Taiwan as long as the colonial
government was not challenged (Chan and Lee 1991). 
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The situation changed in the 1980s when a “local society” was formed.
But at the same time, the Sino-British negotiations and joint declaration
on the future of Hong Kong resulted in a “dual power structure” in which
the power and influence of China and Britain balanced out each other. The
Hong Kong press thus enjoyed an unprecedented degree of freedom in the
transition period (i.e. 1984-1997) (Chan and Lee 1991). Nevertheless, as
the handover approached, China’s influence increased, and the political eco-
nomic structure of the Hong Kong media system also started to change.
Ownership structure
Major changes in media ownership began before the handover, and it was
clear that co-opting media owners would be the most important means by
which the Chinese government tamed the Hong Kong press. The purchase
of South China Morning Post (SCMP) by Robert Kuok and the purchase of
Chinese daily Ming Pao by Tiong Hiew King, both Malaysian tycoons, in
1993 and 1995 respectively, were among the most notable cases. The pre-
sumed economic logic behind these purchases is that being the owner of a
Hong Kong news organisation provides the business person a kind of sym-
bolic capital that can be used in exchange for social and political capital in
the mainland. As a feature article by The Initium wrote:
[According to a former Ming Pao executive], after purchasing Ming Pao,
Tiong Hiew King (…) indeed became someone local officials would
treat seriously because of his identity as “the boss of Ming Pao.” (2)
The former Ming Pao executive was also quoted as saying that Tiong pur-
chased the newspaper at a loss, but Tiong did not mind because the real
gain did not come from the media business. It is difficult for academics to
document how the “real gain” can be materialised, but what the executive
said at least illustrates the common understanding of the symbolic value
of “being a Hong Kong media owner.” In fact, over the years, some media
outlets continued to attract business investment despite the losses they
had sustained. The most obvious case is Asia Television Ltd. (ATV), one of
the two free TV broadcasters in the city between the late 1970s and 2016,
which continued to attract new investors during the 2000s despite having
very low audience ratings and registering financial losses for years. 
By the mid-2000s, most media organisations in Hong Kong were owned
by business people with heavy business interests in the mainland. Fung
(2007) described the situation as non-organisational concentration of own-
ership, i.e. the concentration of media into the hands of not a single corpo-
ration, but a group of business people sharing the same basic interest in
appeasing the Chinese government. 
The relationship between the media owners and the state can be partly
indicated by the formal titles and political awards the state meted out to
the media owners. Table 1 shows a select list of major media owners in Hong
Kong and their titles in political society. For instance, Hong Kong media own-
ers in the 12th session (2013-2018) of the Chinese People’s Political Consul-
tative Conference (CPPCC) include Charles Ho of Sing Tao News Corporation,
Peter Woo of Wharf (parent corporation of Cable TV before May 2017), Victor
Li of CK Hutchison Holdings (parent corporation of Metro Broadcast), and
David Yau of Cable TV (after his joint purchase of the company in May 2017).
Ho, Li, and Yau remain members of CPPCC in the 13th session (2018-2023).
Certainly, with vast interests and connections in the mainland, the afore-
mentioned business tycoons would have gotten their titles and awards
without owning media outlets. Table 1 does not show that media ownership
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Table 1 – Selected list of past or present owners or major shareholders of media organisations
Name Origin Media position Titles in political society
WANG Jing Mainland Major shareholder, ATV (until 2015) CPPCC (2003-2013)
LIU Changle Mainland Major shareholder, ATV (until 2007) CPPCC (2003-2023) / GBS 2016 / SBS 2010
CHAN Wing-kee Hong Kong Major shareholder, ATV (until 2016)
CPPCC (2003-2018) / NPC (1993-2003)
GBM 2016 / GBS 2000
LI Ruigang Mainland Vice-Chairman, TVB (since 2016)
Deputy secretary general of the Communist Party in Shanghai
(2011-2012)
Henry CHENG Hong Kong Major shareholder, Cable TV (since 2017) CPPCC (1993-2018) / GBS 2001
David YAU Hong Kong Major shareholder, Cable TV (since 2017) CPPCC (2013-2023)
Douglas WOO Hong Kong Major shareholder, Cable TV (until 2017)
Member of Beijing Municipal People’s Political Consultative
Conference (2013-2023)
Peter WOO Hong Kong Founding Chairman, Cable TV (until 2017) CPPCC (1998-2018) / GBS 1998
LI Ka Shing Hong Kong Owner, Metro Broadcast (under CK Hutchison Holdings) GBM 2001
Victor LI Hong Kong Owner, Metro Broadcast (under CK Hutchison Holdings) CPPCC (1998-2023)
Richard LI Hong Kong Owner, NOW TV Chairperson, HK Economic Journal
Member of Beijing Municipal People’s Political Consultative
Conference (2013-2018)
Charles HO Hong Kong Chairperson, Sing Tao News Corporation CPPCC (1998-2023) / GBM (2014) 
FUNG Siu Por Hong Kong Chairman, HK Economic Times GBS (2003)
MA Ching-kwan Hong Kong Honorary Chairperson, Oriental Press Group Ltd. CPPCC (2003-2013)
MA Yun Mainland Major shareholder, SCMP (since 2016)
Zhejiang Province People’s Political Consultative Conference
(2008-2012)
Notes: Adopted and revised based on Ma (2007) and updated in 2017-2018. CPPCC = Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference; NPC = National People’s Congress;
GBM = Grand Bauhinia Medal; GBS = Gold Bauhinia Star; SBS = Silver Bauhinia Star.
leads to political recognition; it simply shows how media ownership is em-
bedded in the web of state-business relations.
Forms of control and censorship
Ownership does not entail direct intervention into newsrooms by the
owners, but it entails the possibility of intervention when needed. A case in
point is Ming Pao’s controversial change of chief editorship in early 2014,
when the former chief editor was assigned to another role within the or-
ganisation, and veteran Malaysian journalist Chong Tien Siong was
“parachuted” into Hong Kong to take up the post. Chong’s lack of experi-
ence regarding Hong Kong led to questions about his suitability for the job.
Many Ming Pao journalists worried that his arrival signified Tiong Hiew
King’s attempt to tighten his control of the newspaper. No matter what the
real motivation was, such a move did not occur in the first 19 years after
Tiong purchased Ming Pao. It occurred in 2014, when Hong Kong was em-
broiled in debate surrounding the plans of Occupy Central. 
The most basic reason for the usual lack of direct intervention by owners
is that leaders of large business corporations are unlikely to have time to
do so. Yet media theorists have distinguished between allocative and oper-
ational control (Murdock 1982). Operational control refers to the control
of the daily and frontline operations of the media organisations, whereas
allocative control refers to the control of basic personnel and resource al-
locative decisions that set up the parameters for newsroom operations.
Media owners can exercise allocative control even if they do not exercise
operational control. 
What the allocative and personnel decisions lead to is self-censorship and
constitutive censorship. C. C. Lee defined self-censorship as “a set of editorial
actions ranging from omission, dilution, distortion, and change of emphasis
to choice of rhetorical devices by journalists, their organizations, and even
the entire media community in anticipation of currying reward and avoiding
punishments from the power structure” (Lee 1998: 57). Suspected cases of
self-censorship occurred regularly after the handover, including the firing
of media personnel known for their critical views toward the government
and highly questionable treatment of sensitive stories (e.g. Cheung 2003;
HKJA 2015). In surveys of Hong Kong journalists over the years, the per-
centage of respondents seeing self-censorship as present and serious rose
from 13.3% in 2001 to 39.0% in 2011. (3)
However, self-censorship is notoriously difficult to prove. Suspected at-
tempts to enforce self-censorship within one’s news organisation were never
admitted as such, and it is difficult for observers to prove with certainty
whether questionable treatment of a news story is politically motivated or
simply a wrongheaded judgment. Besides, self-censorship is difficult to pin-
point because it may not be needed. Through resource allocation, adjusting
the routines of news operations, and the production of informal norms and
tacit rules within newsrooms, news organisations can end up producing
largely pro-government content without conscious self-censorship.
Theoretically, Jansen (1988) developed the concept of constitutive censor-
ship to refer to censorship resulting from how human communities establish
rules and norms of discourse that delimit what can and cannot be said. Au
(2017) applied the notion to examine how political biases are produced
through newsroom routines and practices, such as authority supremacy (i.e.
to take whatever the authorities say as valid), novice conformity (i.e. the ten-
dency for new journalists to conform to superiors), and enhanced non-agenda
setting (i.e. to avoid setting the media’s own agenda based on independent
news judgment). These norms and practices were established within news-
rooms over time. Their overall consequence is the marginalisation of critical
and in-depth reporting of important and sensitive matters.
Counteracting forces and the paradox of political
economy
Despite the embedding of the mainstream media into the political eco-
nomic structure, the demise of press freedom was incomplete because of
the presence of counteracting forces. One of the most important counter-
acting forces is journalistic professionalism. Historically, the Hong Kong
media took up the liberal conception of journalistic professionalism as their
legitimating creed in the 1980s. Journalists see themselves as autonomous
agents serving the public interest rather than the interests of political and
economic power (Chan, Lee, and So 2012). They saw the provision of timely
and accurate information as the most important role of the media, followed
by helping the public to understand government policies and monitoring
the power holders (So and Chan 2007). 
Professionalism is also the dominant discourse within many newsrooms.
In fact, suspicious acts of self-censorship were often couched in professional
and/or technical terms. For instance, during the Umbrella Movement, Tele-
vision Broadcasting (TVB) aired a story in the early morning of 15 October
2014 showing seven police officers beating a protester. The voice-over was
later revised to the effect of not explicitly describing the police as “beating
and kicking” the protester. Facing public outcry, the news director of TVB
claimed that the original voiceover was not “objective.” In other words, the
discourse of professionalism was employed to justify a controversial deci-
sion. However, as long as professionalism remains the dominant discourse,
it means that frontline journalists can also use professionalism to argue
against their superiors (Lee and Chan 2009).   
Market concerns constituted another potential counteracting force. Most
Hong Kong media outlets are commercial entities. Although it was noted
that some owners may not care too much if their media organisations are
highly profitable or not, losses incurred by media businesses would still con-
stitute “costs” that cannot be totally ignored. Media organisations have the
incentive to refrain from the most conspicuous forms of self-censorship be-
cause the latter could undermine credibility. Therefore, for a long period of
time after the handover, some mainstream media remained highly critical
of the SAR government even as they became docile when covering China.
Journalists also acknowledged that self-censorship through tone adjustment
was more common than through the more unjustifiable move of totally ig-
noring certain news stories (Chan et al. 2012).
Moreover, as long as a substantial proportion of Hong Kong citizens hold
pro-democracy views, there would be a market for such ideas and informa-
tion. Apple Daily is the most obvious example of a media outlet adopting
the pro-democracy stance as their “marketing position.” Another example
is radio phone-in talk shows on public affairs. At least in the first decade
after the handover, radio talk shows attracted a substantial audience and
constituted an important channel for the voicing of highly critical views
(Lee 2014). 
The existence of even a couple of relatively daring outlets has significant
implications for the media system. Their presence helps push the boundary
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of acceptable public discourse. They play the role of the “first publishers” of
critical viewpoints and sensitive information. Once certain views and infor-
mation are publicised, other media outlets find it more difficult to ignore
the matter. In other words, the presence of a few relatively daring outlets
could effectively maintain a degree of heterogeneity in public discourse. 
In sum, many studies saw the political economic structure of the Hong
Kong media system as the root of the city’s “problem of press freedom.”
Yet professionalism, market forces, and a certain degree of diversity within
the media system helped counter political pressure. Such an analytical
framework remains applicable to the current situation. But there have also
been more recent changes in the political economy of the Hong Kong
media, especially in relation to the market and technological environment
for media businesses. 
Changing media businesses and the entrance
of Chinese capital
As noted earlier, the presumption underlying the politics of media owner
co-option is that owning a Hong Kong media outlet constitutes a form of
symbolic capital useful for business people when they enter the mainland.
This implies a cost-benefit calculation with two basic questions: 1) How
profitable or costly is it to run a specific Hong Kong media outlet? 2) To
what extent is being a Hong Kong media owner actually tied to or capable
of bringing about profits in the mainland? 
Answers to these two questions can vary over time and across media
firms. This section uses Cable TV and Ming Pao as two illustrative cases.
Both are important media outlets: Cable TV is the first pay multichannel
television service provider in Hong Kong and one of only four television ser-
vice providers in the city in 2018, (4) whereas Ming Pao has been a promi-
nent—in terms of circulation, credibility, and influence—elite-oriented
newspaper in the city. Related to the concern of political economy, Cable
TV is an example of a media company owned by a bigger conglomerate
running a wide range of businesses, whereas Ming Pao belongs to a larger
media corporation. Combined together, they can shed light on the changing
incentive structure that media owners have to face.
Cable TV
In 1985, the Hong Kong government announced the plan to introduce
multichannel cable television into Hong Kong as part of a plan to strengthen
the city’s information infrastructure (Lau 1988). Given the huge initial in-
vestment needed, the government offered the operator monopoly status
for three years (which was later extended to six years). Wharf Cable Ltd.,
owned by Wharf Holdings (HK), won the bid and became the first pay mul-
tichannel television operator in Hong Kong in October 1993. 
The development of the business was slow. Cable TV withstood a loss of
HK$650 million in 1995 and HK$580 million in 1996. The government ex-
tended the monopoly status of Wharf Cable and started to allow it to sell
advertising, originally banned because of opposition from the free television
broadcasters. Wharf Cable broke even in February 1998. Then, in August
1999, the SAR government invited the company to submit an application
for operating telecommunication services over its cable network. The com-
pany was renamed “i-cable” and started providing Internet services in Febru-
ary 2000 (Lee 2007).
The offering of Internet service helped stabilise the business of the com-
pany. i-cable consistently made profits between 2001 and 2007 (Table 2).
Meanwhile, the government opened up the pay television market. NOW
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Table 2 – Performance of i-cable 2001-2017
Year
Cable TV subscribers Internet service subscribers Profit Hong Kong China
2001 560,000 160,000 167 --- ---
2002 605,000 225,000 117 --- ---
2003 656,000 258,000 220 --- ---
2004 702,000 291,000 284 --- ---
2005 738,000 320,000 583 --- ---
2006 786,000 328,000 181 --- ---
2007 882,000 306,000 183 8,445 876
2008 917,000 267,000 (111) 7,438 111
2009 1,000,000 249,000 (40) 7,605 918
2010 1,101,000 228,000 (267) 7,977 1,228
2011 1,106,000 218,000 (179) 8,843 2,512
2012 1,089,000 201,000 (278) 10,121 4,019
2013 1,060,000 196,000 (93) 9,882 3,362
2014 1,002,000 186,000 (140) 11,549 2,701
2015 851,000 171,000 (233) 11,409 3,406
2016 909,000 156,000 (313) 12,780 4,234
2017** 850,000 149,000 (363) 11,447 9,124
Notes: Information is derived from the annual financial reports of i-cable and Wharf Holdings (HK). Figures in the last three columns are in million Hong Kong dollars. Bracketed
figures represent losses. ** Wharf sold i-cable to a new group of investors in mid-2017. 
i-cable
Operating profits of Wharf Holdings 
by geographical location
TV, owned by telecommunication company PCCW, began broadcast in
September 2003. TVB also offered its own pay television service in 2004.
As Table 2 shows, 2003 and 2004 marked the peak of Cable TV’s profitability. 
This is not the place to go into the details of the pay TV business. Suffice
it to note that Hong Kong is a small market with only about 2.4 million
households, and the services offered by different pay TV providers are similar
to each other. Since the 2000s, pay TV services also faced the challenge of
the Internet, which offers virtually unlimited amounts of often free audio-
visual entertainment. i-cable began to sustain a loss in 2008. The losses
reached HK$313 million for i-cable and HK$277 million for its TV opera-
tions in 2016. Finally, after nine years of continual losses, Wharf Holdings
(HK) Ltd. decided not to continue to support the operation of i-cable and
sold it to a new group of investors in April 2017.
It might seem normal for Wharf to offload an unprofitable business. In
fact, the losses of i-cable increased further to HK$363 million in 2017. But
following the earlier discussion, one might ask why Wharf was unwilling to
continue to take the loss if owning Cable TV could bring about benefits in
the mainland. In fact, Wharf’s businesses in both Hong Kong and the main-
land are huge and growing (Table 2). Its operating profits in the mainland
rose from HK$918 million in 2009 to HK$4,234 million in 2016. Its oper-
ating profits in Hong Kong also reached HK$12,780 million in 2016. In other
words, in 2016, the loss of i-cable is less than 2% of the profits Wharf de-
rived from Hong Kong and the mainland. When one explains Wharf’s deci-
sion to offload i-cable, the worsening business environment for pay
television is a partial answer. One also needs to consider how the cost-ben-
efit calculation associated with owning a Hong Kong media outlet might
have changed. 
Ming Pao
Starting as a tabloid in the late 1950s, Ming Pao became an influential
middle-class oriented Chinese daily by the 1980s (Cheung 2007). Originally
owned by the famous novelist and essayist Louis Cha, the paper was sold
to Hong Kong businessman Yu Punhoi in 1991 and then to Malaysian busi-
nessman Tiong Hiew King —founder and owner of the timber company Rim-
bunan Hijau Group—in 1995. Tiong entered the media business when he
purchased Malaysia’s Chinese newspaper Sin Chew Daily in 1988 one year
after the paper was closed down by prime minister Mahathir amidst severe
racial conflicts. He bought Guangming Daily in 1992 and then became the
main shareholder of Yayasan Nanyang Press (which owns Nanayang Siang
Pau and China Press) in 2006. In 2008, Tiong established Media Chinese In-
ternational Ltd. by combining Ming Pao with his newspaper businesses in
Malaysia. The move even brought him the nickname “Asia’s Rupert Mur-
doch.” (5)
Tiong thus differs from Peter Woo of Wharf in that he has a relatively big-
ger interest in the media business itself. Notably, he has the experience of
running relatively independent newspapers in the context of authoritarian
countries. His Chinese dailies in Malaysia are, on the whole, more neutral
on political matters when compared to the Malay and Anglophone press in
the country, which tend to be more explicitly pro-government (Abbott and
Givens 2015). In one sense, Ming Pao’s approach of “intensified objectivity”
(Lee and Lin 2006) after the handover—i.e. to emphasise or even over-em-
phasise objectivity and neutrality in order to avoid political risks yet without
turning oneself totally into a government mouthpiece—is similar to the
performance of the Malaysian Chinese newspapers under Tiong. 
With numerous Chinese-language media outlets in hand, Tiong was inter-
ested in expanding not only his timber business but also his media business
in China. Ming Pao collaborated with Guangzhou Daily in the mid-2000s
to publish the North American edition of the latter newspaper (Fung 2007).
The 2008 annual report of Media Chinese International Ltd. stated that the
company had started to develop their markets in “Chinese communities
beyond their existing regional/local markets” through franchised magazines.
In November 2009, the company purchased 25.4% of the shares of ByRead
Inc., then the biggest mobile reading platform in the mainland with more
than 25 million users at that time.  
Despite such efforts, the corporation has failed to truly develop a sub-
stantive business presence in mainland China due to tight control of media
entrance by the Chinese government. By the end of year 2017, on the web-
site of the corporation, there are only three items listed under the category
of businesses in the mainland: 1) the mainland edition of the British car
magazine Top Gear, 2) the entertainment information website hihoku.com,
and 3) mingwatch.com, a website providing information about watches.
As Table 3 shows, the Hong Kong and China sector of Media Chinese In-
ternational Ltd. has not been particularly profitable. Between 2009 and
2014, the profits generated from the HK/China region were typically only
about 10% of the profits the corporation obtained from Southeast Asia.
Since the early 2010s, the profits from Hong Kong and China declined con-
tinually, and losses were registered in each year between 2015 and 2017
(though the corporation’s performance in Southeast Asia also suffered).
Against this background, right after Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba pur-
chased SCMP in December 2015, there were rumours of Alibaba’s plan to
purchase Ming Pao. A Malaysian media observer wrote: 
From the business perspective, if Alibaba offers a good price (which
is not difficult), selling the hot potato of Hong Kong’s (and North
America’s) Ming Pao is not bad for Media Chinese International Ltd.
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Table 3 – Media Chinese International Ltd.’s profits/losses by region, 2009-2017
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
HK & China 3.8 5.3 9.2 9.7 6.3 4.6 (1.8) (3.8) (0.6)
Southeast Asia 52.6 64.4 72.7 70.0 66.5 48.4 39.6 28.3 (3.0)
North America (0.4) 3.5 1.5 (0.0) 0.9 0.3 (1.0) (1.1) (2.5)
Total 55.8 75.0 85.8 81.5 78.0 57.1 43.1 25.9 (3.7)
Notes: A fiscal year for the company begins in April, i.e. 2017 refers to April 2017 to March 2018. Figures are sectoral profits before tax in million USD. Bracketed figures are
losses. “Total” includes profits or losses accrued through “travel and travel-related services,” which are not broken down geographically. Information was derived from the com-
pany’s annual reports. 
(…). China in 2015 is no longer China in 1995. Tiong Hiew King’s
dream of being Asia’s Murdoch is already dying. (6)
Alibaba’s rumoured purchase of Ming Pao did not materialise. But the
emergence of the rumour and passages such as the above do point to a
general perception that, into the mid-2010s, owning a Hong Kong media
outlet is no longer as “sensible” as it was. 
Changing incentive structure and the entrance of
Chinese capital 
The obvious first point to note from the above discussions of Cable TV
and Ming Pao is the increasingly adverse business environment for the Hong
Kong media. Both companies, and in fact other media organisations includ-
ing dominant players such as TVB, have witnessed declining profits or in-
creasing losses in the past several years. A main reason for the decline is
the digital transformation of the media system, an issue to be discussed in
the next section. The straightforward implication here is that the opportu-
nity costs associated with owning a media organisation have increased. 
A second point worth noting is that the mainland Chinese media market
has remained largely closed to outsiders. China’s entrance into the World
Trade Organisation in 2001 at one point led to anticipation of the gradual
opening up of the media market. But 15 years later, the distribution of even
entertainment content ranging from Hollywood movies to Korean TV dra-
mas is still subjected to tight control. The policy is aimed not only at fending
off ideological infiltration, but also at building China’s own media industries
with a view to strengthening the country’s soft power (Su 2014). Hong Kong
media organisations originally hoping to extend their business to the main-
land found themselves facing a brick wall. 
The two considerations point to the increasing costs of obtaining the sym-
bolic capital of “being a Hong Kong media owner.” On the other side of the
equation, one might question if the value of “being a Hong Kong media owner”
has declined. Although it is difficult to directly examine the logic of exchange
in the Chinese business field, we can at least raise a question by comparing
the 1990s to the 2010s. While many Hong Kong corporations were only start-
ing to enter the Chinese market in the 1990s, 20 years later, they have already
established their foothold in the mainland, as illustrated by the huge growth
in profits in the case of Wharf. Influential business people in Hong Kong have
established their alliance with the Chinese state, to the extent that they can
even bypass the SAR government and communicate with the Central Govern-
ment directly to seek their own interests (Fong 2014). If certain symbolic cap-
ital was needed for Hong Kong business people in the 1990s to obtain social
and political capital in the mainland, is it possible that symbolic capital is no
longer needed when they already have social and political capital? 
Meanwhile, the political pressure associated with owning a Hong Kong
media organisation may have become more severe in recent years. Among
Hong Kong mainstream media, both Cable TV and Ming Pao have been re-
garded as relatively liberal. Cable TV’s China news team, in particular, had
received critical acclaim for their in-depth and occasionally daring coverage
of China. Yet the possibility of a pro-China businessman holding a relatively
liberal media outlet is premised on both the state’s level of tolerance and
the businessman’s bargaining power. In the most recent years, as the polit-
ical situation in Hong Kong has worsened and as the Chinese government
has tightened ideological control over the media and society (Zhao 2016),
the state’s tolerance level could have been declining. 
The arguments in the previous paragraphs may contain some speculative
elements, but generally speaking, there are enough reasons for us to state
that the incentive structure was shifting in a direction that makes owning
Hong Kong media less and less attractive to a Hong Kong business person.
It does not mean that no one is entering the field, but the general trend is
that Hong Kong (and regional) business people are leaving the field, whereas
mainland Chinese capital is entering the scene. Alibaba’s purchase of SCMP
and Shanghai media mogul Li Ruigang’s purchase of shares of TVB were the
most eye-catching moves. 
Since the trend is recent, we have little knowledge at this point about the
motivations and constraints behind the entrance of Chinese capital into the
Hong Kong media scene. It is also too early to judge how big a difference
“Chinese capital ownership” would make. Yet just as a matter of fact, since
the Cable TV transaction in mid-2017, nine out of 26 mainstream media
outlets in Hong Kong have mainland Chinese stakes (HKJA 2017: 5). (7)
Digital transformation and its implications
A discussion of the political economy of contemporary media cannot ignore
the changes brought about by digital technologies. Digital media are not so much
content-producing institutions as platforms on which both old and new media
institutions operate. Digital media also have become the primary platforms
through which citizens acquire the news. In an online survey by the Reuters In-
stitute for the Study of Journalism in 2017, 84% of Hong Kong respondents
named “online media” (including social media) as their sources of news, and 43%
named online media as their “main source” of news (Lee et al. 2017). 
The following further discusses the implications of digitalisation on the
news business. The discussion then turns to the new “online news outlets,”
with an emphasis on how political economic forces are shaping the online
media landscape in Hong Kong.
Business problems of conventional media in the
digital world
Traditionally, media organisations operate by selling bundled content to
the audience and audience attention to advertisers. When the Internet ar-
rived in the 1990s, many news organisations began to establish their web-
sites. In an environment where free content was widely available, most news
organisations decided not to charge for online subscriptions. At the same
time, corporations remained unsure about the efficacy of online advertising.
Hence the conventional business model did not work in the online world:
news organisations did not charge the audience for content, and the online
attention they garnered did not generate much advertising revenue. 
Digital advertising has grown substantially in more recent years with the
further development of Internet and mobile technologies. According to
statista.com, total revenue in Hong Kong’s digital advertising market
amounted to US$998 million in 2018 and is expected to surpass US$1,800
million in 2022. (8) But as digital advertising has matured, the digital media
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8. https://www.statista.com/outlook/216/118/digital-advertising/hong-kong# (accessed on 14 Au-
gust 2018).
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environment has also been tremendously transformed. Social media (e.g.
Facebook) and search engines (e.g. Google) constitute the most important
platforms and gateways through which people access content. With access
to “big data” and thus the ability to push highly personalised ads to users,
social media sites and search engines are obtaining a substantial proportion
of the digital advertising revenues. According to a report by Digital in Asia,
the total digital ad revenues in the Asia Pacific amounted to US$8.74 billion
in the first quarter of 2018. Facebook and Google accounted for US$5.70
billion, i.e. more than 60% of the total. (9)
In addition, digital and social media provided the platform for the emer-
gence of new types of small-scale media outlets that can nonetheless at-
tract a sizeable niche audience. In Hong Kong, the Facebook pages of some
KOLs (Key Opinion Leaders) can have more than 100,000 fans and followers.
Since some KOLs have very distinctive interests and/or content focuses,
they can be attractive venues for advertisers who want to reach specific
audience niches. The result is the further diminishing of advertising expen-
diture on conventional media organisations. 
Apple Daily, or Next Digital (or Next Media before October 2015) as a
whole, is arguably the most illustrative case when considering how digital-
isation has affected the business performance of a conventional news or-
ganisation. The company is illustrative because it was highly aware of the
need to face the digital challenge. It started offering Animated News online
in 2009—consisting of short audio-visual news clips, often about sensa-
tional stories and with frequent use of graphics and animation. While the
product might be ethically controversial, it was once regarded as highly suc-
cessful in attracting a huge online audience (Ma, Lau, and Hui 2014).
However, this endeavour did not prevent the company from facing a sharp
decline in its business. As Table 4 shows, the revenue Next Digital obtained
from its online businesses did increase substantially between 2011 and
2014. But the growth almost stopped in 2015, and even declined in 2016
and 2017. Besides, the growth in Internet revenue was far from enough to
compensate for the drop in sales of print media and print advertising rev-
enue: the total revenue derived from the first four categories of Table 4
dropped from HK$3,321 million in 2011 to HK$967 in 2016. The sharp de-
cline forced the company to close down the magazines Sudden Weekly and
Face in 2015 and 2016 respectively. In March 2018, Next Magazine became
digital only.
Beyond conventional media companies, the lack of a sustainable business
model has also affected the development of new online media outlets. For
example, online news outlet The Initium, established in 2015, had to cut
down its staff size in April 2017 from about 90 to around 30. (10) One direct
consequence of the media’s struggle for survival is the dwindling resources
news organisations can expend on in-depth and/or investigative reporting.
The worsening business environment thus has important implications for
the media’s ability to play a watchdog role and monitor power holders.  
From Internet alternative media to parallel echo
chamber
Certainly, while the Internet and social media have created huge chal-
lenges to the news business, they have also reduced distribution and repro-
duction costs and thus allowed small-scale, low-cost media outlets to
emerge. In Hong Kong, the Internet has facilitated the development of on-
line alternative media and some small-scale news operations. 
The development of online alternative media is particularly significant
where freedom of the press is concerned. Alternative media can be defined
as media outlets that challenge the mainstream media’s power to define
reality (Couldry and Curran 2003). Alternative media outlets are structurally
independent of dominant political and economic institutions, and they typ-
ically espouse an oppositional ideology. In Hong Kong, the first wave of on-
line alternative media emerged mainly in the form of online radio after the
2003 July 1 protest. While many of them did not survive for long due to fi-
nancial reasons, a second wave of alternative media, mainly in the form of
news-cum-commentary websites, emerged around 2012 (Leung 2015). 
There have not been systematic studies of the financial and organisational
aspects of alternative media outlets in Hong Kong. But the cost of operating
alternative media can be as low as around HK$1 million per year, as in the
case of Inmedia Hong Kong, a commentary website established in 2005.
Some alternative media outlets have a somewhat larger staff size. The Stand
News, one of the most prominent alternative media outlets in the city, had
16 employees in 2015. But the monthly operational cost was still only
HK$500,000 at the time. (11)
Alternative media are the sites where critical viewpoints are published
and politically sensitive topics are discussed. As opposed to conventional
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Table 4 – Revenue breakdown of Next Media Ltd. (Next Digital since October 2015), 2010-2017
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Sales of newspapers 783 744 665 608 496 417 355 308
Sales of books/magazines 260 239 199 161 134 89 51 31
Newspaper advertising 1533 1614 1544 1325 987 665 455 343
Books/Mag. advertising 644 724 688 627 513 309 106 45
Printing services 240 234 220 184 179 189 167 173
Internet businesses 13 47 157 364 648 660 650 594
% of total accounted for by Internet
businesses
0.4% 1.3% 4.5% 11.1% 21.9% 28.3% 36.4% 39.8%
Notes: A fiscal year for the company begins in April, i.e. 2017 refers to April 2017 to March 2018. Internet businesses include advertising income, subscription, and content pro-
vision. Figures are in million HKD and come from annual reports of the company.
news media, many of the alternative media prefer advocacy over the norms
of objectivity and neutrality. Empirical research has shown that online al-
ternative media consumption is related to more critical views toward the
government, stronger perceptions of self-censorship in the mainstream
media, and higher levels of protest participation (Leung and Lee 2014).
These media outlets thus help maintain and expand the range of public dis-
course available to citizens.
Nevertheless, online alternative media and other small-scale online news
outlets have several interrelated limitations. First, the lack of resources
means that many of them do not engage in much original news reporting.
They often focus on publishing commentaries and repackaging the news
offered by conventional media, but the latter practice only adds to the plight
of the conventional news organisations. 
Second, the pro-establishment forces have set up a number of Facebook
pages for the circulation of pro-government information and discourse sur-
rounding key public issues, with Silent Majority for Hong Kong, HKG Pao,
and Speak Out Hong Kong among the most prominent ones (see Table 5).
Backed by the superior resources of the pro-establishment forces and often
adopting polemical rhetoric, these pages often obtain levels of engage-
ment—in terms of likes, shares, and comments attracted by their posts—
even higher than those obtained by the critical alternative media outlets
during heated controversies. (12)
Third, with the presence of both online alternative media and pro-govern-
ment outlets, and given how the Internet has facilitated heightened degrees
of selective exposure (Sunstein 2017), media outlets on both sides are likely
to reach mainly the supporters on their own side. The oppositional views
publicised through the online alternative media are therefore unlikely to be
able to influence the public at large. Instead, as Chan and Fu (2017) illustrate,
when the online outlets on the two sides of the political divide formed into
distinctive clusters, public opinion would become more polarised, i.e. the
outlets only succeeded in reinforcing the views of their supporters.
Certainly, the latter phenomenon happens not only in Hong Kong. What
Chan and Fu (2017) illustrate is the implication of the general phenomenon
of cyberbalkanisation, i.e. the segregation of the Internet into small groups
with shared interests and views. For this article, the important point is that
cyberbalkanisation is not a “natural” phenomenon arising merely out of
people’s tendency toward selective exposure. In Hong Kong, while the state
can hardly eliminate the online alternative media, its supporters have at-
tempted to minimise the influence of alternative media through creating
their own outposts, resulting in a balkanised cyberspace where the circula-
tion of anti-government views becomes restricted.  
Concluding discussion
This article reviewed the changing political economy of the Hong Kong
news media in the first two decades after the handover. The mainstream
media remain deeply embedded in the web of state-business relationships.
As with 20 years ago, many media owners are business people having vast
interests in the mainland. Yet ownership control does not entail constant
intrusion into newsroom operations. The tug-of-war between political pres-
sure and journalistic professionalism persists to the present and is likely to
continue.
Nonetheless, the political economic structure is not fixed and unmoving.
It is argued that, while business tycoons have established their footholds in
China, “being a Hong Kong media owner” may no longer be as valuable as
it was. At the same time, due to both social and technological changes, the
media business is facing huge challenges. The opportunity costs of running
a Hong Kong media organisation have increased, thus further reducing the
incentives for Hong Kong business people to own media organisations. The
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development has paved the way for the entrance of Chinese capital into
the Hong Kong media scene. 
Writing in the early post-handover years, Chin-chuan Lee (2000: 291)
has noted that “the impact of the new political economy on media
structure and content has been uneven and paradoxical,” because “eco-
nomic concerns of the media create a political space for their workers
to operate, to breathe, and even to defect or resist state structure.” Two
decades after the handover, market concerns as a counteracting force,
while not having disappeared completely, seem to have weakened sub-
stantially. 
The popularisation of the Internet and social media once led to much op-
timistic discourse about the power of new information technologies to pro-
mote freedom of information. But in recent years, more scholars have noted
the limitations or even anti-democratic tendencies of social media (Sun-
stein 2017) and how authoritarian countries have developed sophisticated
methods to tame the Internet. MacKinnon (2013) has coined the term “net-
work authoritarianism” to refer to the ways China controls digital media
through a mixture of practices including censorship, astroturfing, supporter
mobilisation, monitoring of online opinions, and so on. The Chinese govern-
ment may not be able to employ its full repertoire of Internet control in
Hong Kong, but the pro-establishment camp has drawn upon its superior
resources to establish a strong online presence. 
This article thus explains the decline in press freedom in Hong Kong from
a political economy perspective. In the foreseeable future, two issues are
especially worthy of attention. The first is whether the entrance of Chinese
capital into the Hong Kong media scene will continue, and what the con-
sequences of the trend are. Whether mainland capital is different from or
worse than Hong Kong capital for the free press is after all an empirical
question. Yet it might be argued that, compared with mainland Chinese
business people, Hong Kong and Southeast Asian tycoons are less likely to
turn their media outlets into explicit propaganda machines. Hong Kong
business tycoons, who belong to the local society, might be more sensitive
toward the “tradition of press freedom” in the city. Their “political mission,”
as commonly understood, was to ensure that their media organisations
would not step outside the boundaries of acceptability. Hence there is still
a distinction between conservative mainstream newspapers and newspa-
pers directly sponsored by the CCP, such as Wen Wei Po and Ta Kung Pao.
The question is whether owners from mainland China would carry a dif-
ferent “political mission” and hold a fundamentally different understanding
of the press, and whether they will change the rules and norms of news-
room operation. 
Second, the continual evolution of the digital media environment will have
important implications for freedom of expression in the city. Barring ex-
treme and radical measures, the Chinese and Hong Kong governments will
have to live with the existence of a free Internet in Hong Kong. Yet that
does not mean that the governments cannot strengthen their attempts to
control public opinion through extending some of the means of Internet
control in the mainland to the city. For example, in the prelude to the Um-
brella Movement, the emails of one key proponent of the occupation cam-
paign were leaked. The event hinted at online surveillance by the state.
Some observers have expressed the worry that the Chinese and Hong Kong
governments will expand their surveillance work in the city (Tsui 2015).
Finally, it is worth noting that press freedom is impossible without the
presence of freedom of speech in society at large. As stated at the beginning,
it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss this broader problematic.
Suffice it to reiterate the point that how the Chinese and Hong Kong gov-
ernments shape the legal parameters for free speech in the city, such as
through the proposal to introduce China’s national anthem law to Hong
Kong and the possible re-initiation of national security legislation, consti-
tutes another issue of concern. 
Nevertheless, to end the article on a less gloomy note, freedom of expres-
sion and of the press in Hong Kong is not totally dead. The struggles and
negotiations for press freedom are still going on. It is up to professional jour-
nalists to conduct their local resistance within newsrooms, up to civil soci-
ety groups to enact online alternative media to communicate alternative
views and information, and up to ordinary citizens to offer support to those
media outlets that are willing to hold onto their professional principles and
challenge the powerholders. 
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